Introduction
Since Taylor (1993) showed how a simple linear combination of in ‡ation and GDP deviations from trend to some extent mimicked the path of the U.S. Federal Funds rate in the period 1987Q1-92Q4, a voluminous literature has assessed monetary policy conduct through what is now known as the Taylor rule. From a practical and normative perspective, policy deliberations in many central banks include the Taylor rule as a yardstick for good policymaking.
1 Also, theoretical research and model-based forecasting often use
Taylor-type rules as a default representation of monetary policymaking, or as a potential approximation to optimal policy; see Galí (2008) for a recent textbook exposition.
An important characteristic of the rule is that the nominal interest rate should be raised more than proportionally when in ‡ation raises-this is often labelled an active
Taylor rule. This response is viewed as important, as it is conducive for in ‡ation stability.
For example, it precludes sun-spot-driven equilibria in forward-looking economies. The empirical literature has thus often focused on whether the rule is active or not (e.g., Clarida et al., 2000) .
The objective of this note is to assess whether the Taylor rule has had any relevance for monetary policy in the Euro area since its inception in 1999. Our empirical evidence shows that it has not. Despite the fact that in ‡ation stability is the primary objective of the European Central Bank, the ECB has not responded systematically to in ‡ation. Instead, the main determinant of interest-rate changes, within a class of simple response functions, is economic activity, e.g., unemployment changes in the Euro area. We argue that this does not need to be an indication of problematic monetary policy conduct-neither in terms of stability issues, nor in terms of optimality considerations.
Theory, estimation strategy and data
In our main formulation of a testable behavioral expression for the ECB, we follow the literature and allow for the inclusion of expected future variables to capture potential forward-looking aspects in monetary policy; see, e.g., Gerdesmeier and Ro¢ a (2006), Gerlach (2007) and Gerlach and Lewis (2010) for reviews of the empirical literature on ECB behavior. A forward-looking Taylor-type setting of the target value for the nominal interest rate i t , is usually modelled as:
where t in the in ‡ation rate, is the goal value for in ‡ation, y t is output, y n t is the natural rate of output, x t is a vector of other variables that may in ‡uence interest-rate setting, E t is the rational expectations operator conditional on information available in t, and ( ; ; ; ; ) is the vector of parameters to be estimated. The speci…cation allows for both k > 0 and h > 0, i.e., that the ECB may respond to expectations about future in ‡ation and the output gap. As is standard is the literature, autocorrelation in observed nominal interest rates motivates estimation of a partial adjustment model:
where P m j=1 j is interpreted as the degree of "interest rate smoothing,"and e " t is an i.i.d. "policy shock."
Initial examinations of (2) gave results that were very sensitive to speci…cation. One reason could be that data are nonstationary (or near integrated), which would render parameter estimates spurious. Indeed, it is not possible to reject nonstationarity of most of our variables; cf. the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests in our Supplementary Appendix 4. This property of data has been acknowledged in the empirical literature, but most researchers nevertheless assess versions of (2) arguing that the unit-root tests have low power in short samples. While we are sympathetic towards this argument, the di¢ culty of obtaining robust results led us to estimate (2) in …rst di¤erences, where data according to the ADF tests are likely to be stationary.
2 Thereby, we are unable to identify and , but as our interest is monetary policy responses at the business cycle frequency, lack of identi…cation of these long-run parameters is less important. In the case of m = 2 (the highest value we found signi…cant), (2) then becomes
( is the di¤erencing operator), and thus by (1):
We estimate (3) by General Methods of Moments (Hansen, 1982) as the right-hand side variables are endogenous and/or unknown in period t. 3 Replacing expected values by actual values, the relation becomes
where " t (1 Table 1 presents the parameter estimates for (4) at various k h. This choice of leads are motivated by the conventional wisdom that monetary policy changes …rst impact on output and then later on in ‡ation. Apart from Hansen's J-test, we also report the adjusted R 2 and the Ljung-Box Q-test for autocorrelation (up to, and including, 18 lags). These diagnostics are not pertinent to GMM estimation (and note that a negative R 2 is possible), but we include them to give some information about the …t and behavior of the residuals of the estimated relations. The information set re ‡ects that HICP in ‡ation is only known with a month's lag and unemployment with two months'lag.
Results
The estimations based on observable output reveal one consistent pattern, namely that in ‡ation never enters signi…cantly (and only in the instance of a six month lead is the estimated parameter value in conformity with an active Taylor rule). Output enters significantly in some instances, but the point estimates varies substantially across speci…cations (also, the speci…cations su¤er from either autocorrelation of errors or high J-statistics).
The estimations based on expectations of current output, deliver strongly signi…cant estimates of , and the point estimates are quite similar across speci…cations. In ‡ation at any horizon enters insigni…cantly. The speci…cations including expected future output all perform rather poorly. In the case where both output and in ‡ation are six-month ahead expectations, we obtain a signi…cant estimate of the impact of in ‡ation. The point estimate is very high, 3.23, but the speci…cation su¤ers from strong autocorrelation in residuals, and a lack of explanatory power. Also, in the other speci…cations where in ‡ation enters as six-month ahead expectations, point estimates are very di¤erent (-0.41 and 1.58, respectively). Finally, interest rate smoothing is virtually absent; some speci…cations portray a signi…cant impact of interest-rate changes two months before, but these mostly occurs in speci…cations where output and in ‡ation are insigni…cant. All in all, the most robust …nding is the signi…cant impact of current output changes on current interest-rate changes, as well as the lack of any systematic e¤ect of HICP in ‡ation. Notes: GMM estimates of (4) g. We adopt an iteratively updated weighting matrix, and Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent estimators using the Andrews and Monahan (1992) method with AR(1) pre whitening. J is the Hansen test for the validity of overidentifying restrictions (with the associated P -value for rejecting validity in parenthesis). Q (18) is the Ljung-Box Q-test for autocorrelation of residuals up to 18 lags (with the associated P -value for rejecting no autocorrelation in parenthesis). y Signi…cant at the 5% level. z Signi…cant at the 1% level.
Since the output measure is derived from quarterly data, we make the same estimations in Table 2 , except that output is replaced by unemployment for which we have monthly data. The results qualitatively corroborate those presented in Table 1 . Current unemployment has a strongly signi…cant impact on interest-rate setting, and the point estimates are comparable to those obtained with output as the activity variable. (HICP in ‡ation only enters signi…cantly in one speci…cation; with a negative sign.) The results seem more robust compared to those based on output when it comes to the validity of the moment conditions. No matter at what horizon in ‡ation enters, the J-tests show that one cannot reject the validity of the moment conditions when unemployment enters contemporaneously. Quantitatively, the results suggest that an increase in Euro-area unemployment by 1 percentage point is met by a decrease in the short interest rate by over 100 basis points. Again, consistent evidence on interest rate smoothing is hard to …nd-two-month lagged interest-rate changes have signi…cant impact in some instances, but mostly when unemployment enters at an insigni…cant lag or lead.
To further examine interest-rate setting, we run the regression with expected current unemployment and HICP in ‡ation and add (…rst di¤erences of) other macroeconomic variables one at the time. In all cases, variables enter contemporaneously, and for those that are endogenous or unobservable at t we add their lagged values to the instrument set (the number of lags determined from univariate autoregressive properties). In each case, we also present the results for the case where we eliminate the insigni…cant HICP in ‡ation. Table 3 reports the results, where column contains the estimated coe¢ cient to the variable under consideration. Note that in the case without any additional variables, the speci…cation is virtually unchanged when HICP in ‡ation is removed from the equation.
Of some interest is the estimate of when M 3 growth is added. It is negative, and signi…cantly so when in ‡ation is not included. This does not support that the ECB takes money growth into account when evaluating in ‡ationary pressures, which contrasts with its o¢ cial reliance of so-called "monetary analysis" (cf. Papademos and Stark, 2010).
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The price of oil enters signi…cantly and with the expected positive sign, but only in the case where in ‡ation is absent (the magnitude is very modest though; a 50% increase in the oil price leads to a 20 basis point nominal interest-rate increase). The ECB's economic sentiment index enters signi…cantly with the expected sign-inclusion of this activity measure, however, do not rule out an independent response to unemployment movements. Movements in exchange rates, Dollar/Euro rate or the e¤ective real Euro rate, are not found to have any impact on interest-rate setting. The same applies for the long (10 year) Euro bond rate.
As our sample includes data from one of the most turbulent economic periods in recent decades, the …nancial crisis that erupted in the Fall of 2008, it is of concern to assess whether our main results are dependent on this event. Indeed many of the larger swings in the nominal interest rate occur during the crisis. This issue has recently been addressed by Gerlach and Lewis (2010) who estimate a Taylor-rule model allowing for endogenous regime shifts. They use data in levels and …nd a regime shift around September 2008.
This coincides with the collapse of the Lehman Brothers. We therefore introduce a dummy capturing this shift. "Dummy 1"is results for the inclusion of a dummy that takes on zero up until September 2008, one half in September 2008, and one afterwards (interestingly, this crude dummy closely mimics the estimated indicator for regime shift in Gerlach and Lewis, 2010) . The dummy variable is insigni…cant. As we conduct estimations in …rst di¤erences, we also consider the dummy in di¤erences-see the results for "Dummy 2".
Here, the dummy is signi…cant when in ‡ation is not part of the equation (and has the expected negative sign), but unemployment is still a signi…cant impetus for interest-rate changes (note that this speci…cation su¤ers from strong autocorrelation in errors). To further examine the potential impact of the …nancial crisis, we reestimate the basic equation for a briefer sample ending in June 2008. As seen, the basic result stands unchanged.
Our main …nding that unemployment, and not in ‡ation, drives interest-rate changes does therefore not seem to be a result of the …nancial crisis.
Discussion
The main objective of the ECB is price stability, and it has succeeded in achieving this fairly well. Our results indicate that it is not caused by adherence to anything remotely close to a Taylor rule during the past 11 years. This …ts well with several ECB statements (cf. Asso et al., 2010) . Upon re ‡ection, it should not be a cause of concern either. 8 This is also emphasized by Gerlach (2007) . He considers the ECB's actual, and discrete, decisions on changes in the repo rate in contrast with our focus on a target for the market-determined EONIA. Nevertheless, our focus on interest rate changes makes our paper more related to his than to the large level-estimation based literature. Interestingly, and in accordance with our …ndings, Gerlach's ordered probit analysis does not detect a notable in ‡uence of in ‡ation per se on interest-rate decisions.
Second, the failure of identifying an adherence to an active Taylor rule should not lead to inference about potential stability problems in the Euro area. As one of us has emphasized elsewhere, empirical estimates are characterizations of equilibrium relationships between macroeconomic variables. If these variables result from a central bank conducting optimal monetary policy in a world that is (somewhat) forward looking, these equilibrium relationships may exhibit small correlations between the nominal interest rate and in ‡ation. Jensen (2009) presents estimations on simulated data from a small-scale New-Keynesian model with optimal discretionary policymaking in a stable and fundamental-based equilibrium. There, data looks as if an inactive Taylor rule has been followed. Furthermore, if optimal policy is conducted under commitment, the central bank's ability to a¤ect expectations causes the correlation between the nominal interest rate and in ‡ation to vanish or even become negative in data at some horizon of in ‡ation expectations. Intuitively, if a central bank can …ght current in ‡ation by "talking" in ‡ation expectations down, the current interest rate needs to be increased very little, and its equilibrium correlation with in ‡ation expectations may become negative.
The lack of empirical identi…cation of an active Taylor rule could therefore be seen as Our transformation of the raw data: 100 times the logarithm.
